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  This paper examines whether Working Capital Management (WCM) is 
sensitive to market imperfections such as asymmetric information, agency 
conflicts or financial distress. We find that firms have a target investment in 
working capital and that they take decisions in order to achieve this. In addition, 
the results appear to support the hypothesis that the working capital competes 
with investment in fixed assets for the funds of the firms when they have financial 
constraints. Finally, we also find that WCM depends on bargaining power and 
other financial factors such as the availability of internal finance, cost of 
financing and access to capital markets.  
 
Keywords: net trade cycle, working capital management, market imperfections, 
panel data.  
JEL classification: G30, G31, G32. 
 
Resumen 
  Este artículo analiza si la gestión del capital circulante está afectada por las 
imperfecciones de mercado tales como la asimetría informativa, los conflictos de 
agencia o las dificultades financieras. Los resultados muestran que las empresas 
tienen un nivel de inversión en capital circulante objetivo y toman decisiones con 
el fin de alcanzarlo. Además, los resultados parecen apoyar la hipótesis de que el 
capital circulante compite con los activos fijos por los fondos de las empresas 
cuando éstas tienen restricciones financieras. Finalmente, la gestión del capital 
circulante depende del poder de negociación y otros factores financieros tales 
como la disponibilidad de financiación interna, el coste de financiación y el 
acceso a los mercados de capitales.  
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  31.   Introduction 
Since the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) showing that a firm´s 
financial structure is irrelevant to investment, the literature on investment decisions has 
been enlarged by many theoretical and empirical contributions. It has shown that in the 
presence of market imperfections, firms may prefer one source of funds over another 
because of a wide cost-wedge between internal and external funding sources. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) show that firms present a preference for internal over external funds, and 
in the case of external funds, a company prefers debt before equities. In fact, Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen, (1988) test the financing hierarchy hypothesis and suggest that 
the firms´ investment may depend on financial factors such as the availability of internal 
finance, access to capital markets or cost of financing.  
The investment that firms make in current assets, as well as the current liabilities 
used, represents an important share of items on a firm´s balance sheet. Decisions about 
how much to invest in receivable accounts and inventories, and how much credit to 
accept from suppliers, are reflected in the management of firms’ working capital. This 
may have an important impact on the profitability and liquidity of the firm (Shin and 
Soenen, 1998), so firms have to evaluate the trade-off between expected profitability 
and liquidity risk before deciding the working capital policy to adopt. 
Despite the importance of working capital management for the profitability of 
the firms (Smith, 1980; Soenen, 1993; Jose, Lancaster and Stevens, 1996; Shin and 
Soenen, 1998; Deloof, 2003; and Garcia and Martinez, 2007), there has been little work 
on the empirical determinants of the working capital management. Chiou, Cheng and 
Wu (2006) analyze firm characteristics and macroeconomic factors that might affect 
working capital management for companies from Taiwan. Kieschnick, Laplante and 
Moussawi (2006) also study the determinants of WCM, in this case, for a sample of US 
companies. However, these studies have several limitations. First, they do not control 
for endogeneity. Second, none of these existing empirical studies has shown the 
possible existence of a target level of the measures of working capital management, 
even though its existence appears to be evident. Several previous studies (Nadiri, 1969; 
Emery, 1984: Blinder, 1986, among others) have shown that firms have  target or 
optimal levels for their individual components such as accounts receivable, inventories 
and accounts payable. Moreover, under imperfect capital markets, firms have to 
evaluate the trade-off between costs and benefits of maintaining a larger investment in 
working capital.  
  4In this paper we attempt to extend the empirical research on working capital 
management in a number of ways. First, in contrast to the existing empirical studies, 
this paper adopts a dynamic framework, which assumes that firms have a target 
investment in working capital and that they adjust their current investment gradually 
over time because of adjustment costs. Second, we use panel data because it allows us 
to control for unobservable heterogeneity, making it possible to exclude biases deriving 
from the existence of individual effects. Third, we use two-step GMM estimator to 
avoid the problem of possible endogeneity. For example, several studies have shown 
how the measures of the working capital management affect profitability and firms´ 
sales. Finally, we present empirical evidence for a sample of Spanish firms in the 
context of the continental model, which is characterised by less-developed capital 
markets (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 1998), low investor 
protection and high concentration of ownership. It allows our results to be compared 
with others obtained for companies with different financial systems.  
Following Shin and Soenen (1998), we use the Net Trade Cycle (NTC) as a 
measure of working capital management. NTC indicates the number of “days sales” the 
firm has to finance its working capital under ceteris paribus conditions. Our findings 
indicate that firms have a target Net Trade Cycle and they adjust their current Net Trade 
Cycle to their target gradually over time because of adjustment costs. Moreover, the 
speed of adjustment is relatively quick, which may be because being in disequilibrium 
is costly for this sample. On the other hand, the results reported in this study suggest 
that firms that are capable of generating more internal funds have a longer cycle. The 
results also lend support for Fazzari and Petersen´s (1993) argument that working 
capital competes with the investment in fixed assets for the funds of the firms when they 
suffer financial constraints. The hypothesis that companies with a greater bargaining 
power follow a more aggessive working capital policy is also supported by the findings 
of this paper. Finally, our results suggest that Net Trade Cycle also depends on other 
financial factors such as the cost of financing and access to capital markets. Thus, we 
obtain that growth opportunities, probability of financial distress and cost of external 
financing negatively affect NTC. However, we do not find support for the hypothesis 
that leverage influences the measures of working capital management.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops 
the hypotheses and reviews the previous studies on working capital management. In 
section 3 we describe the empirical model and data. We present our results in section 4 
and relate them to earlier findings. Finally, the main conclusions are presented in 
Section 5.  
  52.   Theoretical framework and hypotheses  
In perfect capital markets, investment decisions of a firm are independent of its 
financial situation (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Since there is no capital rationing, 
firms can always obtain external financing without problem, so the firms´ investment 
should be driven only by expected future profitability and, therefore, should not be 
affected by the availability of internal funds. However, in imperfect markets, the firms´ 
investment may depend on financial factors such as the availability of internal finance, 
access to capital markets or cost of financing (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988). 
Under this situation, the working capital level held by companies may also be sensitive 
to these financial factors.  
The Net Trade Cycle (NTC) and Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) are the most 
popular measures of working capital management used in previous works, due to the 
criticism of static measures (Gitman, 1974; Kamath, 1989). Both of these measures are 
a dynamic measure of ongoing liquidity management, and they are closely correlated. 
The CCC is calculated as (accounts receivables/sales)*365 + (inventories/cost of 
sales)*365 - (accounts payable/purchases)*365 and shows the time lag between 
expenditure for the purchase of raw materials and the collection of sales of finished 
goods (Deloof, 2003). So, the longer this time lag, the larger the investment in working 
capital. The Net Trade Cycle (NTC) is basically equal to the CCC, but the three 
components (accounts receivable, inventories and accounts payable) are expressed as a 
percentage of sales, so indicating the number of “days sales” the firm has to finance its 
working capital (Shin and Soenen, 1998).  
Increasing these cycles may positively affect firms´ profitability for two reasons. 
First, it may increase firms´ sales (Blinder and Maccini,1991; Smith, 1987; Emery, 
1987; Deloof and Jegers, 1996; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; and Ng, Smith and Smith, 
1999). These works show that firms´ sales increase when they increase their investment 
in inventories or trade credit granted. Second, Ng et al., (1999) and Wilner (2000) also 
demonstrate that firms may get important discounts for early payments when they 
reduce their supplier financing. However, this benefit has to offset the costs of a larger 
investment in working capital when firms operate under imperfect capital markets. First, 
firms have a financing cost. Second, the main cost of holding a higher working capital 
level is the opportunity cost, because a firm may forgo other more productive 
investments in order to hold that level. Finally, and according to Soenen (1993), longer 
cycles might also lead companies to bankruptcy.  
  6Hence, under imperfect capital markets, companies may have an optimal Net 
Trade Cycle that balances the costs and benefits of maintaining it and which maximizes 
their value. In addition, since a longer cycle indicates a need for additional capital, it 
may depend on agency costs, asymmetric information and financial distress, because 
these lead to a higher cost of financing external and credit rationing.  
Asymmetric Information and Agency conflicts 
Asymmetric information and agency costs could lead to either underinvestment or 
overinvestment. On the one hand, given the limited liability of shareholders, they might 
carry out riskier investment projects (problem of overinvestment), because shareholders 
would benefit from the firm’s higher value, while creditors would suffer the possible 
losses (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, the conflict between 
shareholders and creditors, according to Myers (1977), can also lead to a problem of 
underinvestment, because given the priority of creditors in case of bankruptcy, 
shareholders may decide not to carry out or to abandon investment projects with a 
positive net present value when the net present value of the investment is less than the 
amount of debt issued. Consequently, firms have to pay a risk premium, which results in 
a higher cost for external sources of funds. In this sense, the pecking order theory of 
Myers (1984) states that firms give priority to resources generated internally over debt 
and new equity. This idea has been supported by several earlier studies that have 
demonstrated that the amount of corporate investment is affected by its internal 
financing (Fazzari et al., 1988; Carpenter, 1995; Kadapakkam, Kumar and Riddick, 
1998; Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein., 1991; Hadlock, 1998; Cleary, 1999; Moyen, 
2004). Greenwald et al., (1984), on the other hand, suggest that asymmetric information 
may also result in credit rationing in competitive markets, which might also affect the 
level of firms´ investment. Hence, and taking into account these hypothesis, internal 
funds should also positively influence the firms´ working capital investment, as is 
demonstrated by Fazzari and Petersen (1993). 
Growth opportunities is another variable that might affect working capital 
management, because firms with higher growth perspectives have more severe agency 
conflicts between creditors and shareholders (Myers, 1977) and larger asymmetric 
information due to their value being largely determined by these growth perspectives 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Thus, we would expect these companies to have a shorter 
cycle. The results obtained by the empirical evidence, however, lead to opposite 
conclusions about the effects of this variable. Kieschnick et al., (2006) show that this 
  7variable positively influences Cash Conversion Cycle for US firms, while Chiou et al., 
(2006) do not find any relation between these variables.  
These problems, on the other hand, are also sensitive to leverage, according to 
the existing literature. The results obtained by Krishnawami et al., (1999) appear to 
indicate that agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors decrease also with 
private debt, which predominates in Spain. In this line, to the extent that debt ratio acts 
as a proxy for the ability of the firms to obtain debt it would be expected that firms with 
higher leverage (greater ability to raise debt) will hold more investment in working 
capital.  
Firm size is another factor influencing these agency costs. The agency problem 
between shareholders and creditors is expected to be attenuated by size (Smith and 
Warner, 1979), since smaller firms suffer more severe asymmetric information between 
insiders and outsiders (Jordan et al., 1998; and Berger et al., 2001), due to the fact that 
less public information is available to them. Thus, this factor would be expected to 
positively influence the length of this cycle. However, we should also mention that this 
variable has also been associated in the literature with the firm´s bargaining power with 
its suppliers and customers, showing that larger firms have a greater bargaining power, 
so they might have a shorter NTC. According to Long et al. (1993), Lee and Stowe 
(1993), and Pike, Cheng, Cravens and Lamminmaki (2005), smaller firms have to 
extend more credit to guarantee their products, given their lower reputations. In 
addition, they are offered less trade credit (Niskanen and Niskanen, 2006). With regard 
to the results obtained from the empirical evidence, they lead to contrary conclusions 
about the effect of this variable on the measures of working capital management (Moss 
and Stine (1993); Jose et al., (1996); Kieschnick et al., (2006) and Chiou et al., (2006)).  
Finally, we also expect investment in fixed assets to influence Net Trade Cycle. 
The problems of asymmetric information and agency conflict between shareholders and 
creditors are expected to be more serious for companies with lower fixed investment 
and greater intangible assets, because these latter assets cannot be easily valued by 
potential external investors and these firms would have a lower liquidation value of 
their assets. Thus, shareholders might decide to carry out greater risk projects in these 
firms if the liquidation value of their assets is lower than the debt value. We should 
expect, hence, a positive relation between this variable and the Net Trade Cycle. 
However, when firms operate under imperfect capital markets, they bear financial 
constraints, so this variable might compete with the working capital for firm´s capital in 
  8this situation, as is reported by Fazzari and Petersen (1993) and Kieschnick et al. 
(2006). 
Financial distress 
We also introduce the variable probability of financial distress because the 
agency conflicts commented above are more pronounced for financially distress firms. 
The costs of financial distress arise when the firm cannot meet its payment obligations 
either in the short or the long term. This can affect the Net Trade Cycle of firms, since 
companies with a greater probability of financial distress  have more difficulties in 
obtaining capital. Given that a longer cycle indicates a need for additional capital, these 
firms might have a shorter NTC.  
3.    Method and Data 
3.1. Method 
Following the theories described in the previous section and considering the 
costs and benefits of keeping working capital, we assume that firms have a target Net 
Trade Cycle. Firms´ current Net Trade Cycle may not always equal their desired cycle 
and, hence, firms might take time to adjust from actual to the desired cycle. This can be 
for several reasons. Nadiri (1969), for instance, suggests that firms cannot always 
estimate their sales accurately and with certainty, and hence neither their purchases; 
they do not accurately anticipate changes in monetary policy or in the rates of default 
and bad debts on their trade credit; and the discovery and collection of delinquent 
accounts take time and involve costs which may be distributed over time. 
Like Shin and Soenen (1998), we use the Net Trade Cycle as dependent variable, 
which is calculated by the following expression: NTC= (accounts receivables/ 
sales)*365 + (inventories/sales)*365 - (accounts payable/sales)*365. Thus, it provides 
an easy estimate for additional financing needs with regard to working capital expressed 
as a function of the projected sales growth. 
With regard to the independent variables, the capacity to generate internal funds 
is proxied by the variable cash flow (CFLOW), defined as the ratio of earnings before 
interest and tax plus depreciation to sales.  
We use two proxies to measure the growth opportunities. GROWTH1 is 
calculated by the ratio market-to-book value of assets ((market value of equity + market 
  9value of debt) / total assets), while GROWTH2 is defined as the ratio market-to-book 
value of equity (market value of equity / book value of equity).  
The ratio of total debt over total assets (LEV) is used as proxy for the leverage. 
We use the natural logarithm of assets (SIZE1) and the natural logarithm of sales 
(SIZE2) to measure the size. The investment in fixed assets (FA) of the firm is measured 
by the ratio tangible fixed assets over total assets.  
The likelihood of financial distress (ZSCORE) is calculated according to the re-
estimation of Altman´s (1968) model carried out by Bergley et al., (1996), given by the 
following expression:  
ZSCOREit = 0,104*X1 + 1,010*X2 + 0,106*X3 + 0,003*X4 + 0,169*X5
where X1 = Working capital / Total assets; X2 =Retained earnings / Total assets; X3 = 
Net operating profits /Total assets; X4 = Market value of capital / Book value of debt; 
X5 = Sales / Total assets. Thus, a higher ZSCORE implies a lower probability of 
insolvency.     
Finally, taking into account the previous studies on the determinants of working 
capital management and the theories described in section 2, we also introduce the 
variables cost of external finance (FCOST) and profitability (PRO) as independent 
variables. We expect firms with a higher cost of external finance to hold a smaller NTC, 
since the cost of funds invested in it is higher. This cost is also measured by two 
proxies. The first (FCOST1) is calculated by the ratio financial costs/(total debt - 
accounts payable). In the second one (FCOST2) we do not eliminate accounts payable 
of the total debt. On the other hand, the empirical evidence demonstrates that return also 
negatively affects measures of working capital management. The ratios earnings before 
interest and taxes over total asset (PRO1) and earnings before interest and taxes over 
sales (PRO2) are used in our analysis as proxies for this variable.  
Thus, Net Trade Cycle can be explained by the following variables:  
NTC*= f (internal resources, growth options, leverage, size, fixed assets, probability of 
financial distress, cost of external finance, profitability) 
 
Firms may be very different from each other and there are other characteristics 
that might influence their Net Trade Cycle that are difficult to measure or hard to obtain, 
and which are not in our model. Therefore, we use panel data, because it allows us 
control for unobservable heterogeneity, making it possible to exclude biases deriving 
  10from the existence of individual effects (Hsiao, 1985). Additionally, we can also include 
time effects to capture the influence of economic factors that may also affect the length 
of Net Trade Cycle. Finally, it allows us examine a partial adjustment model to confirm 
whether firms pursue a target Net Trade Cycle.  
If there is a target Net Trade Cycle, firms should take the appropriate steps to 
achieve it. However, adjustment is not immediate because firms have to bear costs of 
adjustment, so they will adjust their current NTC according to the following expression: 
         1 0 ) 1 , , * ( 1 , , < < − − = − − γ γ t i NTC t i NTC t i NTC t i NTC                  (1) 
where NTCi,t  is the Net Trade Cycle in the period t, and NTC*i,t is the target Net Trade 
Cycle, which is estimated from the following equation:  
t i t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i t i
PRO FCOST ZSCORE FA
SIZE LEV GROWTH CFLOW NTC
, , 8 , 7 , 6 , 5
, 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 , *
ε β β β β
β β β β β
+ + + + +
+ + + + =
   (2)  
where  t i, ε is a random disturbance and   k β  are the unknown parameters to be estimated. 
The expression  ) * ( 1 , , − − t i t i NTC NTC  is the adjustment required to reach the 
firm’s target NTC, and the coefficient   measures the speed of adjustment, which is 
inversely related to adjustment costs, and takes values between 0 and 1. If 
γ
0 = γ , 
then , and the current Net Trade Cycle remains as in the previous 
period, indicating that companies bear high adjustment costs. If, in contrast, 
1 , , − = t i t i NTC NTC
1 = γ , then 
, and firms immediately adjust their Net Trade Cycle to their target.  t i t i NTC NTC , , * =
If we substitute equation (2) into equation (1) and we include the unobservable 
heterogeneity and the time dummy variables, the current NTC is determined by the 
following expression:  
t i t i t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i t i t i
PRO FCOST ZSCORE FA
SIZE LEV GROWTH CFLOW NTC NTC
, , 8 , 7 , 6 , 5
, 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 1 , ,
υ λ η δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ ρ α
+ + + + + + +
+ + + + + = −    (3) 
where  t i t i k k and , , 0 ; ); 1 ( ; γε υ γβ δ γ ρ γβ α = = − = =  
Parameter  captures other characteristics of firms which are not observable but 
which have a significant impact on the length of the Net Trade Cycle. These change 
i η
  11across companies but remain fixed for a given firm through time. The variable t λ , on the 
contrary, is a time dummy that changes in time but is equal for all firms in each of the 
time periods considered. This parameter is designed to capture the influence of 
economic factors that also may affect the length of this Cycle, but that firms cannot 
control. Finally, the parameters   t i, υ are random disturbances.  
We use the instrumental variable estimation method to avoid the problem of 
endogeneity, which appears to be evident in our analysis, as several studies have shown. 
For example, the working capital management might affect profitability (Jose et al., 
1996; Shin and Soenen, 1998; Deloof, 2003; and Garcia and Martinez, 2007) and firms´ 
sales (Blinder and Maccini, 1991; Smith, 1987; Emery, 1987; Deloof and Jegers, 1996; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1997; and Ng et al., 1999). If we do not control for endogeneity, it 
might seriously affect the estimation results. Thus, we use the two-step GMM estimator 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) because, although the estimator of instrumental 
variables in one stage is always consistent, if the disturbances show heteroskedasticity, 
the estimation in two stages increases efficiency. 
3.2. Data 
The data for this analysis were obtained from three sources of information. First, 
data from financial statements have been taken from the SABI (Iberian Balance Sheets 
Analysis System) database, which was developed by Bureau Van Dijk. Second, the 
market value of equity was extracted from CNMV (Spanish Security Exchange 
Commission). Finally, Gross Domestic product data were collected from the Bank of 
Spain.    
Our data consists of non-financial Spanish firms listed on the Spain Stock 
Exchange for the period 1997-2004. We have selected firms whose information is 
available for at least five consecutive years between 1997 and 2004. From this, we 
obtained a panel comprising 502 observations corresponding to 60 firms.  
Table 1 reports the median values of Net Trade Cycle by sector and year. We 
observe that the Net Trade Cycle differs between sectors, which supports the industry 
effect on the firms´ working capital management suggested by earlier studies 
(Hawawini, Viallet and Vora, 1986; Weinraub and Visscher, 1998; Filbeck and 
Krueger, 2005; and Kieschnick et al., 2006). So, the largest Net Trade Cycle during our 
period of analysis is found in retail trade (162.19 days). In contrast, transport and public 
services (37.99 days) has the smallest. On the other hand, it seems that some sectors
  12present significant changes for the selected research period. We can see how the NTC 
has been reduced in all sectors from 1997 to 2004, except in agriculture and mining. 
This could indicate that firms have been improving their working capital management 
and have adopted more aggressive working capital policies in recent years. 
Table 1 
Net Trade Cycle by year and sector 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  1997-2004 
Agriculture and 
Mining 
53.36  61.34  219.93 187.08 173.19 185.38 181.28 135.22  72.85 
Manufacturing  92.17 111.95  116.42  107.40 91.16  90.16 106.55 91.49  100.35 
Construction  73.33 83.25 79.20 70.87 63.20 66.58 47.44 58.20  70.23 
Wholesale trade  138.60 117.62 165.66  93.45  97.77  106.01 106.70 118.45  112.12 
Retail trade  208.40 186.33 126.03 127.99 135.18 132.96 136.66 142.89  162.19 
Services  132.05  160.19  96.45 88.61 85.87 59.77 79.59 83.87  89.78 
Transport and 
public services 
46.51 67.65 34.52 43.32 41.45 17.55 16.84 23.35  37.99 
Total  90.12  96.9  97.51 92.73 88.19 89.70 85.80 84.98  91.46 
The Net Trade Cycle is calculated as ((accounts receivable + inventories - accounts payable)/sales)*365 
 
In table 2 we can observe the importance of current assets and liabilities and 
working capital requirements by sector of activity. In addition, we also present the 
median values of the individual components of our dependent variable. The high value 
of current assets over the total assets in the majority of sectors indicates the importance 
of managing them efficiently. So, the largest investment in current assets over the total 
assets is in construction (72.7%) and retail trade (67.8%). With regard to the average 
periods by sector, we can see that the firms dedicated to the agriculture and mining take 
least time to collect payments from their customers and are also the first to pay their 
suppliers. In contrast, firms from the construction sector grant their customers the 
longest period in which to pay and take longest to pay their suppliers. In relation to the 
inventory, it is stored the longest in wholesale trade, while it is stored the least in 
transport and public services.  
Table 2 
Firms’ characteristics by sector of activity 
  AR  INV  AP  CA/TA CL/TA WKR 
Agriculture and Mining  69.69 21.75 26.61  0.244  0.242  0.118 
Manufacturing  104.34 59.47  54.52  0.456  0.325  0.229 
Construction  176.05 37.42 146.72  0.727  0.595  0.155 
Wholesale trade  77.16 88.83 50.28  0.573  0.576  0.313 
Retail trade  152.21 73.54  49.23  0.678  0.245  0.465 
Services  106.72 50.44  51.34  0.475  0.366  0.168 
Transport and public services  93.41 6.87 66.94 0.165  0.245 0.035 
This table shows the median value of firms’ characteristics by sector of activity. AR is 
the ratio (accounts receivable / sales)*365; INV the ratio (inventories / sales)*365; AP 
the ratio (accounts payable / sales)*365; CA/TA is the ratio current assets to total assets; 
CL/TA the ratio current liabilities to total assets; WKR is the ratio accounts receivable 
plus inventories minus account payables to total assets. 
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observe the mean values, we can see that the mean Net Trade Cycle in our sample is 
115.19 days. These firms have had positive growth perspectives during the selected 
research period and an investment in fixed assets over the total assets of 50.6%. They 
generate a cash flow of 16.9% over sales and present 58.3% of debt over total assets. 
Their profitability over assets and sales are 7% and 10.9%, respectively. 
Table 3 
Summary of Statistics 
 Mean  Std.  Dev  Min  Median  Max 
NTC  115.19 96.506 -29.73  91.46  590.91 
CFLOW  0.1687 0.1279 -0.053 0.1303 0.7371 
GROWTH1 1.3836 0.7360 0.5758 1.1650 5.5831 
GROWTH2 2.074  2.2875 0.1546 1.4696 2.0257 
LEV  0.5833 0.1619  0.078  0.5986 0.9521 
ASSETS  4,276,179 11,700,000  14,882  403,551  91,800,000 
SALES  2,447,147  6,076,944 3,471 362,130.5  44,000,000 
AF  0.5059 0.2172 0.0711 0.4967 0.9872 
ZSCORE  0.3035 0.1575 0.0179 0.2899 0.7285 
FCOST1 0.0593 0.0411 0.0048  0.050  0.3772 
FCOST2 0.0411 0.02767 0.0025  0.0363  0.2206 
PRO1 0.0706 0.0509 -0.1222 0.0633 0.3181 
PRO2 0.1094 0.1070 -0.1443 0.0861 0.6975 
GDP  0.0382 0.0079  0.024  0.036  0.05 
Notes: NTC represents the Net Trade Cycle; CFLOW the cash flows generated by the firm; GROWTH 1 
and GROWTH2 the growth opportunities; LEV the leverage; ASSETS the total assets in thousands of 
euros; SALES  the sales in thousands of euros; AF the investment in fixed assets; ZSCORE the 
probability of financial distress; FCOST1 and FCOST2 the cost of external finance; PRO1 and PRO2 the 
profitability; and GDP the Gross Domestic Product growth. 
 
4.   Results 
Table 4 shows the results from regressing Net Trade Cycle on the different 
variables explained above. To confirm the robustness of our results we present the 
estimation of equation (3) using alternative proxies for some independent variables. In 
addition, in column (6) we estimate the model including the Gross Domestic Product 
growth and eliminating the time dummies to avoid the multicollinearity problem, since 
these dummies should capture that information. The m2 statistic and Hansen test also are 
presented. The m2 statistic indicates there is no second-order serial correlation, and 
Hansen Test shows the absence of correlation between instruments and error term. We 
also present the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each independent variable. Our VIF 
tests are lower than 5, so there is no multicollinarity problem in our sample 
(Studenmund, 1997). In all estimations we control for industry effects. 
  14The results show that the coefficient of the lagged Net Trade Cycle is positive 
and significant at the 1% level in all the estimations made. Hence, our hypothesis on the 
dynamic nature of working capital management is not rejected and we contribute to the 
existing literature on working capital management, finding that companies have a target 
Net Trade Cycle and follow an adjustment process to reach this target. In addition, this 
coefficient is roughly 0.4 in all the estimations made, indicating a relatively quick speed 
of adjustment  ) 6 . 0 ( = γ which appears to support the idea that the costs of being away 
from target cycles are significant for our sample and that a good working capital 
management might be very important for them.  
The adjustment process is a trade-off between the adjustment costs towards a 
target cycle and the costs of being in disequilibrium. Our findings indicate that the costs 
of being in disequilibrium are greater than the adjustment costs. One possible reason 
might be the importance of bank credit for Spanish companies. The financial system of 
the European Union is classified as a bank-based system, except for the UK where 
capital markets are well developed (Schmidt and Tyrell, 1997). Thus, Spain has a 
banking oriented financial system with an important role played by the banks. 
Specifically, in Spain, firms have low transaction costs when borrowing funds from 
banks, and consequently, they could adjust their actual Net Trade Cycle to the target 
cycle quickly. 
As we expected, we find that firms have a larger Net Trade Cycle when they are 
capable of generating more internal funds, so supporting the argument of Fazzari and 
Petersen (1993)  that the investment in working capital might be constrained by a 
shortage of internal funds. In addition, we obtain that this variable has the largest 
economic impact on the dependent variable. Thus, we obtain that an increase of one 
standard deviation in the variable internal funds increases the NTC by 41.8% (over the 
mean).  
Unlike the empirical evidence, and as we also expected, our results show that the 
coefficient of growth perspectives is significant and negative. Hence, we obtain that 
companies with larger growth perspectives have a shorter Net Trade Cycle, supporting 
the idea that these firms tend to use more trade credit as a source of finance for their 
growth (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; and Cuñat, 2007), while companies with sales 
declines tend to extend more credit to their customers so as to increase their sales 
(Emery, 1987; and Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Moreover, the economic significance of 
the influence of this variable on the Net Trade Cycle shows that, all other things being 
  15equal, an increase in the growth options of one standard deviation produces a reduction 
in the NTC of 13%.  
With regard to the effects of leverage on Net trade Cycle, none of the 
coefficients estimated for this variable are significant. Consequently, we cannot provide 
any empirical support for the argument that firms that are capable of obtaining more 
external financing have a longer Net Trade Cycle. Similarly, we cannot provide any 
empirical support for the Chiou et al. (2006) argument that debt ratio negatively affects 
the measures of working capital management. These authors suggest that their results 
are due to the fact that according to the pecking order theory firms only raise their debt 
ratio when their internal capital is depleted, so they tend to have a more efficient 
working capital management in this situation. 
The coefficient of the variable size is negative and significant in all estimations 
at the 1% level, which demonstrates that larger firms have a shorter Net Trade Cycle, 
even though they should have fewer difficulties in obtaining funding and less financial 
constraints. This result might be interpreted as meaning that these firms have a larger 
bargaining power with suppliers and customers, so they have a more efficient working 
capital management. Although smaller firms have less access to capital markets they 
have to extend more credit to guarantee their products, given their lower reputations 
(Long et al., 1993; Lee and Stowe, 1993; and Pike et al., 2005), while they are offered 
less trade credit (Niskanen and Niskanen, 2006). In addition, the economic impact of 
this variable is relevant, since if it decreases by one standard deviation the dependent 
variable increases over its mean by 23.19%.   
We also observe, as in other studies, that the investment in fixed assets has a 
negative effect on the Net Trade Cycle, despite the fact that firms with a higher fixed 
investment also have a better access to capital market. This result appears to support the 
argument developed by Fazzari and Petersen (1993) that the working capital competes 
with the investment in fixed assets for the funds of the firms when they have financial 
constraints. With regard to the economic effect on the dependent variable, an increase of 
one standard deviation in the variable fixed assets reduces the Net Trade cycle by 
30.5%.  
As we expected, we find that firms with a higher probability of insolvency have 
a shorter NTC, since the ZSCORE sign is positive and significant at the 1% level in all 
the estimations carried out. The agency conflicts are more pronounced for these firms, 
so they have more difficulties in obtaining capital. So, they tend to have larger accounts 
payable (Niskasen and Niskasen, 2006), because suppliers tend to lend to them when  
  16banks do not (Cuñat, 2007). In addition, this also could be interpreted as meaning that 
firms with a large probability of insolvency tend to extend less credit to their customers 
and might have a lower investment in inventories. This variable has the second most 
important economic impact (around 40%).  
The coefficient of the variable that measures the cost of external capital is also 
negative and significant, which demonstrates that the Net Trade Cycle also depends on 
the cost of financing, as we suggested above. In fact, our results indicate that an increase 
of one standard deviation in the cost of external finance reduces NTC by 19.6%.  
Our results show, as the empirical evidence, that firms with a higher profitability 
have a shorter Net Trade Cycle. It is known that these firms can obtain funds more 
easily, but that, like larger firms, they also have greater bargaining power with suppliers 
and customers (Shin and Soenen, 1998). Hence, this result  appears to support the idea 
that these firms tend to receive significantly more credit from their suppliers (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1997) and hold lower finished goods inventories (Blazenco and Vandezande, 
2003), while firms facing profitability problems tend to increase trade credit receivable 
prior to entering financial distress (Molina and Preve, 2006). There is also a relevant 
economic impact since an increase in one standard deviation in this variable involves a 
reduction in the Net Trade Cycle of 25.5%.    
Finally, in column 6 we include the Gross Domestic Product growth, since this 
variable could affect the individual components of the Net Trade Cycle, such as 
accounts receivable (Smith, 1987; and Walker, 1991), inventories (Blinder and Maccini, 
1991; Carpenter et al., 1994; and Kashyap et al., 1994), and accounts payable (Nilsen, 
2002). Our results show that the Gross Domestic Product growth positively influences 
the length of the Net Trade Cycle, which demonstrates that when economic growth is 
higher companies have a longer Net Trade Cycle. However, we should mention that at 






  17 
Table 4 
Determinants of Net Trade Cycle 
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(-6.52)  -  -317.89*** 
(-5.21) 
-272.628*** 
(-9.47)  1.07 
FCOST2
- 
  - -  -270.48*** 









(-2.59)  -  -287.14*** 
(-3.89)  2.21 
PRO2
- 
  - -   -249.05** 
(-2.30)  -  
GDP 
  - - - - -  438.66*** 
(4.58)   
m2 -0.58 -0.52 -0.59 -0.49 -0.51  -0.51   
Hansen Test  36.15 (221)  42 (221)  41.08 (221)  38.47 (221)  40.24 (221)  43.75 (223)   
Observations  442  442  442  442  442  442   
Notes: NTC represents the Net Trade Cycle; CFLOW the cash flows generated by the firm; GROWTH 1 and 
GROWTH2 the growth opportunities; LEV the leverage; SIZE1 and  SIZE2 the size; AF the investment in fixed 
assets; ZSCORE the probability of financial distress; FCOST1 and FCOST2 the cost of external finance; PRO1 and 
PRO2 the profitability; and GDP the Gross Domestic Product growth. 
Z statistic in brackets. 
* Indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1%. level 
m2 is a serial correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Hansen test is a test of over-identifying restrictions distributed 
asymptotically under null hypothesis of validity of instruments as Chi-squared. Degrees of freedom in brackets. 
VIF represents the Variance Inflation Factor for each independent variable. 
  185.   Conclusions 
This paper extends empirical evidence on the working capital management in 
several important dimensions, including the treatment of unobservable heterogeneity 
and endogeneity problems. Unlike previous studies, we assume that firms have an 
optimal working capital level and we examine the determinants of current WCM in the 
presence of adjustment costs. Net Trade Cycle is used as a measure of working capital 
management. The proposed model is corroborated using a sample of non-financial 
Spanish companies over the period 1997-2004. Our findings are consistent with the 
view that firms adjust their current Net Trade Cycle to the target NTC gradually over 
time due to the presence of adjustment costs. Moreover, the speed of adjustment is 
relatively quick, which appears to indicate that the costs of being in disequilibrium are 
greater than the adjustment costs because of the importance of bank credit for Spanish 
companies.  
The results also suggest that the Net Trade Cycle depends on the firm´s 
bargaining power with its suppliers and customers as well as on financial factors such as 
the availability of internal finance, cost of financing and access to capital markets. Our 
results indicate that companies that are capable of generating more internal funds have a 
longer cycle, which is consistent with the argument of Fazzari and Petersen (1993) that 
the investment in working capital might be constrained by a shortage of internal funds. 
On the contrary, our findings also show that profitability, size, investment in fixed 
assets, growth opportunities, probability of financial distress, and cost of external 
financing negatively affect Net Trade Cycle. Unlike earlier studies, our results suggest 
that Net Trade Cycle does not depend on the leverage. Finally, we obtain that when 
economic growth is higher, companies have a longer Cycle.  
Further research focused on similar studies in countries with different 
institutional characteristics and financial system would seem to be appropriate, since the 
speed of adjustment and the effect of explanatory variables on NTC might be different. 
On the other hand, it would be also informative to conduct this study for small and 
medium-sized firms, as it would allow us to compare the differences in the cost of 
adjustment between both SMEs and large firms. An efficient working capital 
management is particularly important for SMEs, according to the empirical evidence, so 
they might have a quicker adjustment.  
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